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texts ‘clearly support a naturalistic reading’ (p. 51). I would say, instead, that
these texts merely support what might be called a nested naturalistic reading
and do not undermine the overall metanarrative of scepticism. What seems to
be lacking in Fogelin’s account is a reason to think that his narrative account
supports his radical perspectivist reading of Hume as opposed to a sceptical
one (or a naturalistic one for that matter). In the end, then, it is not clear to
me that this narrative account has delivered what Fogelin hoped that it
would. Perhaps we should conclude this story with a ‘to be continued’.
KEVIN MEEKERDepartment of Philosophy
University of South Alabama
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Ontic structural realism (OSR) has become a much-discussed stance in the
philosophy of science since the end of the 1990s. The present book is the most
extensive and authoritative account of OSR as yet, written by one of its
leading proponents, if not the leading one. Its scope is more limited than
that of the well-known book Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, by
James Ladyman and Don Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
focussing exclusively on OSR as a stance in the philosophy of (fundamental)
science and thereby going more into depth with regards to OSR than does the
monograph by Ladyman and Ross. French’s new book is both a full account
of OSR and the defence of a particular version of OSR. The central idea
around which the book is built can be characterized in this way: laws and
symmetries are ontologically fundamental in that they are the manifestations
of the structure of the world. That structure is not only manifest in the laws,
but it is also what makes up the physical world. Consequently, there is no
need for objects that instantiate the laws or symmetries, or that are governed
by them. This central idea is developed in various ways, both with regards to
the metaphysics and the epistemology of structure thus conceived, going
through a very detailed and always precise and fair discussion of the extensive
literature on OSR, and beyond.
The book can roughly be divided into four parts: chapters one to four are
concerned with the motivation for epistemic structural realism (ESR), the
transition from ESR to OSR, and the history of structural realism. Chapters
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five to seven spell out OSR in detail and in particular defend Steven French’s
radical version of OSR that eliminates underlying objects instantiating the
structures. Chapters eight to ten go into causation and modality, elaborating
on a middle way between a Humean version of OSR and one that is com-
mitted to a fully-fledged objective modality (e.g. in conceiving the structures
that OSR is about as being causal or dispositional structures, thereby being
committed to metaphysical necessity). Chapter eleven and twelve move the
discussion forward to two different areas to which OSR has not been applied
in detail as yet: the philosophy of quantum field theory (Ch. 11) and the
philosophy of biology (Ch. 12). Some of the material on which chapters
one to seven draws has already been published in papers elsewhere; none
the less, it is very useful to see this material fully laid out in the present book,
and French makes many new and illuminating points in doing so. The most
important new arguments of the book come in chapters nine to twelve,
notably the elaboration on a modal view of structures as well as the appli-
cation of OSR to quantum field theory and to biology; whereas the former
can be seen as a natural extension of OSR in quantum mechanics, the latter
explores new territory for the ontic structural realist.
It is widely acknowledged in today ’s literature that OSR is well motivated
as a stance in the philosophy of contemporary fundamental physics. General
metaphysical reservations against the idea of a structural individuation of
fundamental physical entities — by contrast to the traditional view of an
individuation by intrinsic essences of these entities — have become rare in
the contemporary literature. None the less, French’s particular version of
OSR as characterized above remains debatable. This debate concerns, notably,
the following four aspects:
1. The method of metaphysics
French defends what he calls the Viking approach to metaphysics (in par-
ticular Ch. 3). That is to say, he regards mainstream analytic metaphysics as a
toolbox that the philosopher of science can exploit. He advocates in the first
paragraph of the book what he terms a ‘top-down’ approach to metaphysics
‘which at least has the virtue of taking the relevant science seriously in the
sense that it urges that we read our metaphysical commitments more or less
directly off our best theories’ (p. v). However, OSR — and in particular
French’s version of it — certainly is not a metaphysical commitment that
can be read off directly from our best scientific theories, as for instance the
ongoing controversy about the interpretation of quantum mechanics shows.
In brief, it seems that OSR is not a stance that only exploits the metaphys-
ician’s toolbox, but a metaphysics like other metaphysical stances, there being
a gradual difference between mainstream analytic metaphysics and a science-
oriented metaphysics like OSR, but not a difference in kind, which would
give the proponent of OSR the privilege of standing outside the usual con-
troversies in metaphysics by relying on science.
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2. Abstract versus concrete structure
As mentioned above, structures a` la French are both what is traditionally
conceived as abstract entities (laws and symmetries) and concrete physical
entities, making up the empirical world. This is what turns the position that
French defends into a radical form of OSR, because it eliminates objects
altogether as entities that stand in the relations that define the structures
(Ch. 7). By contrast, more moderate versions of OSR reject intrinsic essences
of objects, but still recognize — structurally individuated — objects as the
concrete entities that instantiate the structures, which are manifest in laws
and symmetries (e.g. Michael Esfeld and Vincent Lam, ‘Ontic Structural
Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects’, in Scientific Structuralism ed.
A. Bokulich and P. Bokulich, Dordrecht: Springer, 2011, pp. 143–59; and
most recently Kerry McKenzie ‘Priority and Particle Physics: Ontic
Structural Realism as a Fundamentality Thesis’, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 65 (2014), pp. 353–80). The present book does a valuable
service in illustrating French’s take on OSR, but it does not add anything
substantially new to previous publications with regards to the argument for
this radical version of OSR. For instance, one crucial point is that, even if
structures are to be both abstract (laws and symmetries) and concrete, one
can still with good reason expect OSR to be a able to draw a distinction
between (abstract) mathematical and (concrete) physical structure. Chapter
eight is devoted to this issue, but remains inconclusive. French says at the
end: ‘Perhaps then we simply have to accept that the distinction between the
mathematical and the physical has, at the very least, become blurred or that it
cannot be drawn at all’ (p. 230).
3. The ontology of quantum physics
One central motivation for the metaphysics of OSR is quantum mechanics,
notably quantum entanglement (which, in brief, rules out the possibility to
attribute states to quantum objects taken individually — so that, if these ob-
jects had an intrinsic essence, it could play no dynamical role for their tem-
poral development). French repeats his well-known argument from quantum
statistics that there is an underdetermination between quantum objects as
individuals and quantum objects as non-individuals and that this underdeter-
mination is a cogent reason to jettison the commitment to objects altogether
(Ch. 2). However, OSR has not made its way into the interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics: it is for instance unclear how it sets out to cope with the
notorious measurement problem. The present book does not change any-
thing with regards to that problem. More generally speaking, one can distin-
guish between two main options that are pursued in current research on the
ontology of quantum physics. One option is to take the formalism of the
quantum theory that one adopts to refer to the quantum state, represented by
the wave-function of the universe. Since the quantum state is defined on a
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very high-dimensional space — namely the configuration space of the uni-
verse — this option implies that one is committed to that very high-dimen-
sional space being the space in which the fundamental physical reality is
situated. As David Z. Albert (1996, ‘Elementary Quantum Metaphysics’, in
Bohmian Mechanics and Quantum Theory: An Appraisal, ed. J. T. Cushing, A.
Fine and S. Goldstein, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 277–84, see p. 283, n. 7) has
argued, there is in this case no motivation for OSR, since the quantum state
can then be understood as attributing intrinsic properties to the points of
configuration space and as developing according to a local dynamics in that
space. The other option is to take the formalism of the quantum theory that
one adopts to refer to matter distributed in ordinary space–time. One is
committed, then, to what is known as a primitive ontology with regards to
that matter. The role of the quantum state, then, is limited to the function
that it has for the temporal development of the distribution of matter in
physical space (see, Valia Allori, Sheldon Goldstein, Roderich Tumulka, and
Nino Zanghı`, ‘On the Common Structure of Bohmian Mechanics and the
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber Theory ’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
59 (2008), pp. 353–89). Hence, OSR then concerns the dynamics of matter
distributed in space–time, and it is unclear to say the least how OSR could do
away with a primitive ontology of objects whose dynamics the structures that
are encapsulated in the quantum state describe. In brief, the present book
does nothing to alleviate the central objection to OSR in this area: although
being motivated by quantum mechanics, it falls well short of proposing a
worked out ontology of quantum physics.
4. Modality
It is a central merit of this book that it sets out the first full account of the
modal character of structures in OSR (Chs 9–10). French drives a middle way
between a Humean OSR that repudiates objective modality and an OSR that
applies the theory of dispositionalist essentialism in analytic metaphysics to
structures, and thus transfers the modality built into dispositionalist essen-
tialism to OSR. He develops forceful arguments against both these views:
objections to the Humean treatment of laws in the context of OSR, as well
as objections to the view of dispositional properties underlying the structures
and recent attempts to consider the physical structures of OSR as being
dispositional themselves, maintaining that these attempts cannot do justice
to symmetries and conservation laws. French’s own proposal consists in
claiming a primitive modality for structures. However, it remains unclear
to what extent this primitive modality of structures is distinct from the
primitive modality to which both dispositionalism and primitivism about
laws are committed. Moreover, despite what French takes for granted in
discussing a Humean version of structuralism (e.g. p. 232), the very recent
literature has made clear that if one subscribes to Humeanism, there is no
reason for a commitment to structures at all, since David Lewis’s thesis of
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Humean supervenience can be literally true in the domain of quantum phys-
ics as well (Elizabeth Miller, ‘Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics,
and Humean Supervenience’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92 (2014),
pp. 567–83; Michael Esfeld, ‘Quantum Humeanism, or Physicalism without
Properties’, Philosophical Quarterly 64 (2014), pp. 453–70). This again shows
that there is no such thing as reading ‘our metaphysical commitments more
or less directly off our best theories’ (p. v).
These debatable issues notwithstanding, it is evident that this book does a
great service to the community in fully laying out the case for — a radical,
ontic — structural realism. It is a must for everyone interested in the phil-
osophy of physics and the metaphysics of science in general.
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The idea that choices might be uncaused has generally been regarded as
deeply problematic; hence the non-causalist position has been a fringe one
within the free will debate. In Freedom, Teleology, and Evil, Goetz provides a
compelling defence of the position, demonstrating that it is worthy of deeper
philosophical attention than it generally receives. Further to detailing
and defending a non-causalist account of agency, Goetz defends the prin-
ciple of alternative possibilities against arguments from Frankfurt-style
Counterexamples (FSCs), and attempts, ambitiously, to draw on his account
of freedom in developing a theodicy. I will summarise some of the core
arguments addressed, before briefly exploring some philosophical concerns.
The second chapter sets out the basics of Goetz’s account. He argues that
fundamental data of experience support the claim that there is a basic onto-
logical distinction between a choice, which is fundamentally active, and in-
volves exercising a power, and other states, which are fundamentally passive
and involve merely exercising a mental capacity. He argues that it is a basic
datum of experience that a choice is intrinsically active and uncaused. It is
not merely that it feels as if choices are uncaused, or that we cannot detect a
cause; rather we have direct positive awareness of their non-causal nature.
While choices have no causal explanations, they do have teleological
explanations: our choices are made for reasons. Goetz defends two basic
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